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A B S T R A C T
Following the global trend of moving towards Universal Health Coverage, China has implemented a new round
of health system reform, to achieve universal “safe, effective and affordable basic healthcare services” by 2020.
We review the latest reforms using the World Health Organization framework developed by Murray and Frenk.
In particular, we diagrammatically describe the structure of the current Chinese health system using the dimen-
sions of Stewardship, Resource Generation, Financing and Provision, and assess the variability of access, levels of
benefits, and quality of service across populations. We identified several areas of inequity and inefficiency.
First, the fragmented institutional arrangements, with distinct objectives and responsibilities across agencies,
create potential nonalignment of incentives. Second, there is a marked scarcity of qualified general practition-
ers and infrastructures despite the continuing effort to improve the gatekeeping function of primary care pro-
viders. Third, as risks are pooled only at the local level within different insurance schemes, the considerable
income heterogeneity across geographic territories and resident types can generate significant inequality in
access and funding. Fourth, persistent patient preference for higher quality healthcare at hospitals prevents
the integration of care across tiers. We believe our comprehensive analysis will be informative for both health
policymakers and researchers, in identifying and investigating the inefficiencies of the health system and the
potentials for structural integration to achieve healthcare equity.
1. Introduction
Following the global trend of moving towards Universal Health
Coverage (UHC), China implemented a new round of health system
reform in 2009 to achieve universal “safe, effective and affordable
basic healthcare services” by 2020 [1]. The primary objectives of the
reform included developing primary healthcare services and providing
equal access to urban and rural residents. Since 2017, the deepening of
the healthcare reforms has been accompanied by a “Healthy China
Strategy”, where new directives were introduced to provide more
well‐rounded and full‐cycle health services. While the reform has been
rolled out gradually over the years, access to healthcare and the distri-
bution of the benefits have not been straightforward [2]. The process
was further complicated by increasing income inequality, an ageing
population, low fertility rates, and most recently by the COVID‐19
crisis.
As one of the most rapidly changing and comprehensive efforts
undertaken by a health system in the world, China’s healthcare
reforms warrant an extensive examination of the various dimensions
of its changing health system. A necessary first step is to unravel and
understand the complexities of the Chinese health system; to this
end, we undertake the first assessment of China's health system, using
the World Health Organization (WHO) framework developed by Mur-
ray and Frenk [3]. Our approach is similar to the assessment of the
healthcare systems in Ghana and Nigeria when moving towards UHC
[4]. In particular, we diagrammatically describe the structure of the
current Chinese health system using the four functions of Stewardship,
Resource Generation, Financing and Provision, and we analyse the vari-
ability of access, levels of benefits, and provision across populations.
The strength of our work relies on generating, for the first time to
our knowledge, a diagrammatic overview of China's health system,
which shows the degree of fragmentation, both horizontal and
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vertical, of the functions mentioned above. An overview of the poten-
tial impact on equity and efficiency of the different dimensions of the
healthcare system complements the detailed analysis and descriptions
of the four functions.
1.1. Background of China’s healthcare reform
Major reforms have taken place in China to address the persistent
challenges due to the inconsistencies in healthcare provision, unequal
access, surges in healthcare costs and the burden of chronic illness
arisen from previous reforms towards marketisation. A description of
key facts about China’s healthcare system can be found in the Appen-
dix. In 2009, the government set objectives to increase universal cov-
erage, develop a functioning primary healthcare service that was
previously abolished, ensure equal access for urban and rural resi-
dents, and to improve public hospitals' operating environment [1].
The timeline of the critical events can be found in Fig. 1. Among the
different objectives, three specific reforms constitute the current focus
of the healthcare system design.
Before 2015, the primary care system did not operate under a
patient referral network, resulting in extremely overcrowded hospitals
in major cities. In 2015, a general practitioner referral system was
introduced nationally to improve accessibility and reduce inappropri-
ate use of higher‐tier hospital care. To incentive primary healthcare
facility use and divert patient from large hospitals, a higher reimburse-
ment rate has been set for the former. However, the uptake of the
referral system has been meagre because of the persistent patient pref-
erence for hospital‐based services, even for minor issues [5,6]. Further,
hospitals are heading medical alliances, in the form of networks, to
train lower‐level facilities to improve their perceived lower quality
of care.
Another policy issue was the multitude of medical insurance
schemes as well as the various ministries and agencies involved in
the insurance schemes, which have negatively affected the efficiency
of the system. As a result, an important reform was introduced in
2018 to merge the New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) for rural
residents and the Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance (URBMI) for
urban residents. Despite elevating the coverage of NCMS to URBMI
standards, migrant workers are still not fully protected by the current
set‐up, as they remain insured in their province of origin. This often
translates in lower access to healthcare services, when needed, or in
foregoing healthcare altogether. The main reason is that reimburse-
ment for their cross‐province medical expenses needs to be sought in
the migrants’ province of origin, which is hindered by considerable
travel distances and associated costs [7].
Since public hospitals are financed through government subsidies,
service charges and mark‐ups on drug prices, such structure inevitably
created distorted incentives to prescribe higher volume and more
expensive drugs than necessary to earn additional bonuses. Public hos-
pitals had no incentive to contain cost, thereby dramatically boosted
healthcare expenditure. In 2012, alongside the zero‐mark‐up drug pol-
icy, public hospitals had been asked to become more independent in
running their daily activities [8]. The most recent approach, called
“Modern Hospital Administration System”, evaluates hospital direc-
tors' performance on clearly defined indicators, such as patient volume
and satisfaction, and the level of expenditure, thus realising a more
evidence‐based approach [9]. The new approach also aims at decreas-
ing out‐of‐pocket expenditure and hospital length‐of‐stay [10,11].
Given the rapidity and the complexity of the various reform waves,
one may quickly lose sight of the fundamental building blocks of the
system and the roles they play in facilitating or hindering the imple-
mentation of the reforms. In what follows, we systematically assess
the design of the current healthcare design and its implications on
equity and efficiency.
2. The building blocks of China’s health system
Murray and Frenk [3] recommended that “any systematic attempt
to understand the performance of health systems should include a
study of factors that potentially explain it” [3]. They did so by outlin-
ing and defining the functions or institutional arrangements that are
present in any health system: Stewardship, Resource Generation, Financ-
ing and Provision, within a new framework. We chose to employ the
WHO framework, developed by Murray and Frenk, because it offered
a coherent and consistent approach in identifying a health system’s
intrinsic goals, its key functions and how these interact and influence
the overall performance of a health system. Hereafter, we describe
these functions for China’s health system and discuss the intermediate
outcomes of the current design in terms of efficiency and equity.
2.1. Stewardship
The Stewardship function permeates and shapes the entirety of a
health system, i.e. financing, provision and resource allocation. Mur-
ray and Frenk [3] describe it as comprising three key aspects: (i) set-
ting, implementing and monitoring the rules for the health system;
(ii) assuring a level playing field for all actors in the system, i.e. pur-
chasers, providers and patients; and (iii) defining the strategic direc-
tion for the health system as a whole.
In China, several stakeholders, operating at different government
levels, are responsible for various “Stewardship” functions. Fig. 2 pro-
vides a visual aid of the different organisations/institutions at play.
China's health administration has a four‐level hierarchical struc-
ture. The National Health Commission (NHC, previously the National
Health and Family Planning Commission and the Ministry of Health) is
at the top, followed by provincial health commissions, responsible for
organising and supervising providers. Below these institutions are
prefecture/municipal‐level health commissions that draft local regula-
tions and coordinate resource allocations; and, at the bottom, are
county/district health commissions, which enjoy slight flexibility in
implementing provincial health policies. No independent health
administration exists at the township level, with providers directly
under the county health commission’s supervision.
Fig. 1. Timeline of healthcare reforms in China.
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The majority of the health legislation are administrative laws
issued by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress;
administrative regulations promulgated by the State Council; and local
laws and regulations issued by ministries or local governments [12].
The NHC drafts five‐year plans that include the budgets and competi-
tion policies among healthcare providers [13,14]. The newly estab-
lished National Healthcare Security Administration (NHSA) assumes
the previous roles of the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the Ministry of
Health and the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security.
Specifically, the NHSA manages all the public medical insurance pro-
grams and healthcare personnel, sets prices for essential medicines,
maintains the safety net (e.g. healthcare access) for the poor in rural
areas. The Ministry of Education oversees medical schools, and the
Ministry of Finance produces annual budgets and subsidies and moni-
tors the financial performance of central government spending based
on the five‐year plans. The Food and Drug Administration ensures
safety for drugs and medical devices. Finally, the Bureau of Health Pol-
itics and Hospital Administration, which operates within the NHC, has
the responsibility for assessing and monitoring the quality of health-
care provided [14]. However, there is still limited systematic evidence
on process and outcome measures of quality [9].
The sheer number of independent governmental organisations with
different remits and strategic designs, each carrying out some form of
stewardship function, shows how complex, fragmented and potentially
inefficient the health system governance is in China. Different min-
istries often have conflicting interests and, therefore, do not collabo-
rate proactively. For instance, hospital directors, by design, respond
to multiple government agencies with different objectives at the local
level. At the same time, hospital directors are rarely monitored for
non‐compliance and as a result, are not accountable for inefficiencies
or low quality service [7]. Although the recent creation of the NHC
and NHSA have substantially reduced the organisational fragmenta-
tion, it is still challenging to assign clear accountability of the steward-
ship function, both to the governmental institutions issuing guidance
and regulations at the higher government tiers and to those that are
tasked with implementing them at the middle and lower levels.
2.2. Resource generation
Resource generation entails all the organisations that govern, pro-
duce, and deliver the inputs to health systems. Unlike the financing
function, resource generation involves a wide range of institutions that
are not strictly or directly related to healthcare delivery. The most crit-
ical dimension is human resources, while physical resources such as
buildings, equipment and technology, pharmaceuticals, and overall
knowledge are also part of this function.
The human capital of China's health sector includes medical staff,
nurses and healthcare professionals working in hospitals, primary
healthcare institutions and public health agencies. While the number
of physicians and medical staff is steadily rising, access to medical pro-
fessionals was characterised by wide geographic disparities before
2009 [15,16]. The 2009 reform to achieve universal health coverage
has gradually reduced the inequality of resource distribution in recent
years, but the gap still exists [17]. By 2018, there were about 2.59
physicians per 1,000 population, ranging from 4.01 to 1.82 physicians,
respectively, for urban residents and rural residents [18]. Imbalances
in the absolute distribution of healthcare workforce across regions,
and between urban and rural areas, represent a crucial barrier for
the development of health services, especially in rural areas [19].
The highest level of education attained varies greatly across medi-
cal professionals: from postgraduate and undergraduate, to college/
technical secondary school/high school and below. By law, a doctor
is required to have graduated from a faculty of medicine with a license
to practice [20], whereas in rural areas, village doctors have to pass
only local exams to obtain a “Village Doctor Certification” [21]. Over
the years, the number of medical professionals attaining the highest
qualification has risen, with the proportion of bachelor’s degree hold-
ers increasing from 17.1% in 2005 to 34.6% in 2018 [22]. However,
Fig. 2. Stewardship function.
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disparity persisted across urban and rural areas, especially in terms of
the proportion of personnel that hold a bachelor's degree, or above, in
primary healthcare institutions. Although the Ministry of Education
oversees medical universities, many of the doctors in rural counties
did not have a formal medical education and thus were not subject
to the same level of standard medical training outlined by the ministry.
For instance, only 6% of health workers in rural areas had a bachelor’s
degree [7]. The variability of the qualification across geographic areas
consequently drove patients to travel to urban areas, in order to seek
the best quality of healthcare possible, resulting in extremely over-
crowded hospitals in big cities, as well as in long waiting times.
To ensure some basic level of gatekeeping, the 2009 healthcare
reform introduced a family doctor and general practitioner (GP) refer-
ral system, implemented officially in 2015. However, there was no
established education system for family medicine training, as histori-
cally universities only train specialists. A policy document suggested
a potential change to the education system in order to train undergrad-
uate students to become GPs in three‐year programs, rather than the
traditional “5 + 3″ program for specialists [1]. Overall, the supply
of GP and family doctors are still in their incipient stages, and the roles
are quite different from those that exist in European countries. To
improve the efficiency of primary healthcare delivery, the government
implemented an integrated health information system to connect pub-
lic hospitals and primary healthcare facilities with more ancillary
Internet + health services [23]. However, the data governance
remained fragmented as the NHC hosts the electronic health data
and the NHSA hosts the insurance claim records, while each hospital
also has a unique medical record system – none of the different sources
is interoperable [24]. Therefore, integration of care requires a more
effective electronic health system.
A resource unique to the Chinese health system is the Traditional
Chinese Medicine (TCM) doctor. Typically, TCM doctor practices
either in a TCM specialised hospital or the GP department in local com-
munity centres. During the COVID‐19 outbreak, TCM played a signif-
icant role in effectively treating patients with highly tailored Chinese
medicine [25]. Despite the widespread recognition of their impor-
tance, the trend to westernise TCM professional education may cause
sharp contradictions between the training and the practice of TCM,
which historically followed a rigorous apprenticeship tradition [26].
Similar to most countries, the physical resources in China’s health
system include hospitals of different tiers and specialisations, primary
healthcare institutions, specialised public health institutions, and phar-
macies. The number of hospitals and their capacity has been unequally
distributed across geographic areas ‐ the drastic economic develop-
ment of the Eastern urban regions of China created a higher concentra-
tion of both general and specialised hospitals, for example [23]. This
has resulted in the emergence of a peculiar pattern of healthcare use,
with residents in more affluent areas overusing hospitals for outpatient
care, and residents in more impoverished regions using primary care
institutions for inpatient care [11]. The substantial disparity across
local governments in terms of financial capability, operating efficiency,
quality of care, and continuity of care from primary healthcare centres
to tertiary hospitals remains a major challenge [2], despite the recent
reforms to facilitate a patient referral network and to elevate insurance
coverage of urban residents. This disparity highlights the urgency in
accelerating the development of primary care infrastructures in urban
regions and the investment of higher‐tiered hospitals in the central and
western regions. The current fragmentation in the government financ-
ing system and insurance arrangements needs to be tackled with
urgency in order to (re‐)distribute financial resources adequately and
to redress horizontal resource disparity.
2.3. Financing
Whether it is a collective or a market‐based system, the financing
function in any health system can be divided into three distinct, but
closely interlinked functions: (1) revenue collection, (2) fund pooling
and (3) purchasing. In what follows, we discuss the different functions
and their potential implications on equity and efficiency, along with
the diagrammatic representation of the overall financing structure of
the health system.
2.3.1. Revenue collection and fund pooling
The Chinese healthcare financing system is a mix of public insur-
ance models. The sources of total health expenditure are composed
of government (central and local) taxation, social contributions, and
out‐of‐pocket payments. However, the collection of revenues remains
fragmented, as the pooling of funds and government finance does
not go beyond the prefecture or municipality level.
Two primary public insurance schemes coexist to collect revenues
(see Fig. 3): a mandatory public insurance for urban employees
(cost‐sharing with employers) – the Urban Employee Basic Medical
Insurance (UEBMI), which covers around 300 million workers; and a
voluntary public insurance for non‐working urban and rural residents
including students and children – the Urban‐Rural Resident Medical
Insurance (URRMI), which is a merger between the URBMI and the
NCMS. The URRMI currently covers around 1 billion residents. In
addition, there is a Medical Assistant Program (MAP), for those who
are not enrolled in the other two schemes. Supplementary private
health insurance exists to provide coverage for services not covered
by public insurance. The benefits packages usually cover inpatient care
and critical outpatient care, while catastrophic insurance schemes
exist for specific diseases (e.g. cancer). There is patient cost‐sharing,
through both deductibles and co‐payments, to reduce unnecessary util-
isation of healthcare services and reduce the onset of moral hazard. All
schemes have their distinct formulas for reimbursing drugs and
services.
Within the UEBMI, separate sub‐schemes exist to cater for specific
types of employees: the “integrated social pooling and individual med-
ical savings accounts (MSAs)” for formally employed full‐time work-
ers; the “solitary social pooling” for the 'informally' employed; and
the “lower‐level social pooling” for retirees. The sub‐schemes differ
in the way funds are raised and pooled, and in the type and amount
of coverage offered. Premiums are collected through both employer
and employee contributions (set respectively at 6% and 2% of an
employee's salary). In the first sub‐scheme, employee contributions
are paid directly into their individual MSAs, while employer contribu-
tions are split between the integrated social pooling (around 70%) and
the MSA (around 30%). Contributions in the “solitary social pooling”
schemes are based on the average salary in the local area, while the
contribution is even lower for the “lower‐level social pooling”. In addi-
tion to the social pooling, the UEBMI also receives fixed contributions
set by the central government. However, fund pooling within UEBMI
schemes is horizontally and geographically fragmented, i.e. funds are
pooled only within each sub‐scheme at the municipality/prefecture
level. The fragmentation might generate issues with both vertical
and horizontal equity in financing, access to benefits packages, and
in terms of co‐payments imposed on enrolees. Furthermore, total rev-
enues collected by the UEBMI sub‐schemes may vary substantially,
affecting both the depth and breadth of benefits packages and the
pay‐outs that insurance schemes can make. Recent studies have con-
firmed the imbalance between healthcare costs and choice of hospital
types between socioeconomically developed and underdeveloped
regions [27].
The newly integrated URRMI is funded primarily by central and
local government subsidies, with minimal individual contributions
and funds pooled at the prefecture/municipality level. There is inte-
grated social pooling, but no MSAs. The merger of the previous urban
and rural residence schemes has been carried out in a staggered way,
with considerable variability in the extent of integration across geo-
graphic areas. Eight provinces only enrol resident individuals, while
other provinces do not restrict coverage requirements; additionally,
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in Fujian and Guangdong provinces, there has been full integration
across all three medical insurance schemes [28]. Since the revenue
of URRMI depends mainly upon the financial capability of the local
government, the benefit packages and co‐payment schemes tend to dif-
fer from UEBMI and can vary substantially across geographic units
[29].
Even with the two major insurance schemes, both rural and urban
residents, may have been unable to pay for catastrophic healthcare
expenses. For this reason, the MAP was in place, with free and volun-
tary enrolment. Initially only providing subsistence allowance to low‐
income elderly and disabled residents, the program now extends to
fund comprehensive care for the poor. MAP is subsidised by the urban
and rural medical assistance system. Differently from other insurance
schemes, funds are pooled at the county level.
2.3.2. Purchasing
Purchasing refers to the process by which collected, pooled and
possibly risk‐adjusted funds are allocated to individual or institutional
providers. This process relates to the what, how and from whom
healthcare is purchased and whether or not mechanisms are put in
place to preclude perverse and often inefficient incentives in health-
care providers. In the case of China, the purchasing authorities are
highly fragmented and do not operate under a functioning strategic
purchasing mechanism. The various social insurance schemes were
previously managed independently by two different ministries, with-
out any strategic interaction. In 2018, the NHSA was established to
improve the governance of social insurance programs and change
the ways providers were paid.
Since its establishment, the NHSA has developed the organisational
capacity and improved existing purchasing mechanisms. In the last
two years, the NHSA has set in place effective negotiations between
purchasers, pharmaceutical companies, and hospitals. However, there
is little evidence so far that the new purchasing mechanisms follow the
national objectives set out in the “Healthy China Strategy”.
The new administration is also in the process of implementing a
provider payment reform. Traditionally, China's hospital care has been
reimbursed through a fee‐for‐service reimbursement system. There
was, therefore, a need to set appropriate reimbursement rates/mecha-
nisms for providers. Since the late 1990s, various forms of prospective
payment methods have been piloted to modify healthcare providers'
incentives, while the first version of Diagnosis Related Group (DRG)
was established in the 1980s. In 2017, the State Council issued a
new policy, which resulted in around 30 cities implementing the
DRG system by 2018 [30]. However, the DRG system implemented
in China is still rudimental and in an early adoption phase. Many dif-
ferent forms of (prospective) payment systems are still widely used,
despite recommendations for uniformed dissemination [31].
Additional to payments received from social insurance schemes,
public hospitals also receive direct funding from governments at vari-
ous tiers. The direct funding is in the form of global budgets, not tied
to the needs of the facilities or the populations served, or linked to the
performance of the hospitals [32]. They are usually determined by the
size of the hospital and the local fiscal capacity, disjoined from incen-
tives set in terms of quality of care or efficiency targets [33].
Despite recent efforts, China is still far from being able to imple-
ment strategic value‐based purchasing.
2.4. Provision
Similar to other sectors of the economy, the provision of healthcare
comprises the selection and combination of inputs that, through a pro-
duction process, leads to the delivery of healthcare goods and services.
In China, the NHC is in charge of the national health development
planning and management of the healthcare system, while commis-
sioners at the provincial, municipal and county levels are responsible
for the delivery of healthcare services. The health delivery system is
mixed, comprising both public and private providers. In 2012, there
were 912,620 primary health centres (PHC) in China, 52% of which
were public facilities, with the rest equally split between private for‐
profit and private not‐for‐profit [7]. Secondary and tertiary general
hospitals provide most outpatient and inpatient services, and spe-
cialised hospitals provide mental, dental and oral health services
[12]. In 2012, there were 23,170 hospitals in China, of which just
under 58% were public, about 15% were private not‐for‐profit and just
under 28% private for‐profit [7]. Although hospitals have been
increasingly endowed with more and more autonomy over their daily
operations (traditionally operated under a “command and control”
model), the government still exerts administrative power over several
managerial aspects such as bed numbers and the appointment of key
managers. As a result, public hospitals are accountable to the corre-
sponding political authorities and are subject to several public organ-
isations. This distorted version of a semi‐autonomous model has been
Fig. 3. China's healthcare system.
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regarded as one of the root causes for the inefficiencies in the delivery
of healthcare.
Since 2006, a two‐way patient referral regulation has been in place
to promote the rational use of health services [12]. In principle,
patients in urban areas should first seek medical services at a primary
healthcare institution, from which they are then referred to secondary
and tertiary hospitals. The ultimate aim is to integrate the three levels
of healthcare provision fully. The rapid demographic and epidemiolog-
ical changes, due to an ageing society and increasing burden of non‐
communicable diseases, reinforced the need to transform its
hospital‐centric and volume‐driven system into an affordable, high‐
quality care system around the model of the patient‐centred integrated
care [7]. However, many of the factors mentioned elsewhere in this
paper, such as the fragmented governance arrangement, the lack of
qualified healthcare professionals and the variability of financing
schemes, all pose significant barriers for the full integration across
the different tiers. Finally, the integration process was further compli-
cated by the existence of separate and independently managed organ-
isations, loose definitions of provider function across tiers, as well as
ambiguous referral criteria guidelines [7].
The COVID‐19 outbreak emphasised the (mis‐)functioning of the
public health system in China. By design, primary healthcare institu-
tions and specialised public health facilities assume the role of provid-
ing public health services, while some community health centres and
village clinics offer complementary services such as disease manage-
ment, rehabilitation, health education and family planning. Other
highly‐specialised public health institutions such as the Centre for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention, health education institutions, maternal
and child health institutions and mental health institutions provide dif-
ferent kinds of professional public health services [23,12]. The NHC
and the State Administration of Work Safety are responsible for occu-
pational health, work safety, and launching relevant regulations [34].
Several departments within the NHC are in charge of the administra-
tion of public health, including the Disease Control Bureau, Health
Supervision Bureau, Emergency Response Office, Primary Healthcare
Department, Maternal and Child Health Department, and Food Safety
and Supervision Department [12]. Local health bureaux at each level
have also set up similar departments which are responsible for local
public health management. As there is no single organisation that
manages public health, the COVID‐19 outbreak has highlighted the
need to address current failures and shortcomings as urgency in the
near future.
All institutions involved in service provision are shown in Fig. 3.
3. Discussion
To some extent, the experience of China's healthcare reforms has
been unique, given its top‐down approach of implementation, and
the radical overthrow of existing policies and structure. On the other
hand, the cycle of reforms has been driven by ideological changes,
due to a change of leadership and the shifting of government’s prefer-
ences between a government and a market‐oriented health system.
This process is not too different from many other high‐ and low‐
middle‐income countries that have experienced various levels of cen-
tralisation, decentralisation and liberalisation [35]. Moreover, in
China, reforms were often constrained/limited by the geographical
size of the country and variation in terms of socio‐economic develop-
ment. This has led the central government to rely on extensive use of
pilot programs, mostly run at the provincial level, to investigate the
potential effects of new health policies before national roll‐outs. The
rationale behind this approach is to allow each province a higher level
of discretion within their own jurisdictions when implementing cen-
trally designed policies so that these can be tailored to local health
needs and reflect local fiscal capacity. Consequently, the main factors
influencing the adoption and implementation of these recent reforms
have been local pressures to respond to local governance problems,
imitation of innovations adopted by peers, and regional preferences.
This decentralised approach has resulted in significant variations at
the local level. In more recent years under President Xi’s leadership,
China has been experiencing an increase re‐centralisation of political
power, which has meant a renewed expectation for centrally designed
policies to be implemented ‘as is’ at the local level. Nonetheless, local
governments can still choose from an array of models when imple-
menting central policies.
What the Chinese lesson offers is a compelling case that involves
the largest population experiencing a rapid change from a highly
profit‐driven and unequal healthcare system to, at least in principle,
near‐universal coverage [36], but with many of the historical problems
still plaguing the system. However, the incredible efforts and momen-
tum exerted by the government, and the firm will for the improvement
of the population health, are commendable.
In our effort to systematically describe and assess China’s current
health system, we have identified several areas of concern. The geo-
graphic disparity is profound in terms of healthcare infrastructure
and human resources between rural and urban area, and between
the more affluent regions along the coast and more impoverished Wes-
tern inland provinces. Moreover, because the social pooling of insur-
ance funds is only carried out at the prefecture and municipality
level, and within each scheme, the marked disparity across geography
and individual residence status can generate significant inequality in
total funds available as well as in the breadth and depth of benefits
packages offered. This inequality is a consequence of considerable
variations in the socio‐economic development of the country, and
which we believe requires concerted efforts by the central government
to redistribute the necessary financial resources and healthcare work-
force following the principle of both horizontal equity in access and
vertical equity in financing. Even within economically advanced areas,
a shortage of qualified primary healthcare practitioners and infrastruc-
ture contributed to the inexistent gatekeeping function of primary
healthcare providers. Since patients persistently exhibited hospital‐
centric preferences when seeking healthcare, there was an intrinsic
tension which prevents the intended integration of care across tiers.
These challenges are interconnected and have not been sufficiently
addressed by the fast‐paced implementation of the reforms. Finally,
the existence of multiple insurance schemes and funding pools high-
lights the inherent inefficiency of the overall system design, with obvi-
ous and often non‐necessary duplication of cost functions. The absence
of a well‐developed and structured purchasing function, with reim-
bursement still often linked to historical expenditure or based on a
fee‐for‐services system, is probably the source of recent escalating
healthcare costs. The introduction of a nationally unified DRG‐based
reimbursement system might improve current inefficiencies, but only
if specific financial and quality targets are concurrently introduced.
Our analysis of the four functions of the Chinese health system has
brought to the fore a common thread: the enormous complexity of the
four functions and the health system as a whole. There is a myriad of
institutions, organisations and agencies, operating in a highly frag-
mented environment, both horizontally ‐ across different ministries
and department ‐ and vertically ‐ across the different level of govern-
ments. They often have conflicting and ill‐defined remits, lacking com-
mon objectives and scopes, a clear set of incentives and
accountabilities, and more importantly, strategic integration. This
finding implies that sustainable and scalable reforms have been com-
promised, as agencies and ministries often act to defend their own
interests, rather than working towards the achievement of the com-
mon good. The successful implementation of the health reforms in
China may have been historically weakened by flawed decision‐
making processes which are too often, and sometimes exclusively, reli-
ant on interagency bargaining [7].
Our descriptive analysis of the four functions of a healthcare system
provides a valuable overview of the Chinese health system and has
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highlighted areas of its system design and reforms that warrant future
assessments and evaluations. The latter cannot be carried out without
a good understanding of the former, as Murray and Frenk originally
suggested with their framework.
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Appendix
China has a vast territory, with 1.4 billion people, and is the world’s
second‐largest economy by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) [37]. Since
early 2000, health expenditure has been on the rise, with per capita
expenditure at purchasing power parity reaching almost $1,200 in
2016, compared to about $200 in 2000 [37]. Though health expendi-
ture as a proportion of GDP only increased from 4.5% to around 7%
over the years (Fig. 1), the volume is considerably high given the dras-
tic growth of the overall GDP. The burden of out‐of‐pocket expenditure
as a proportion of total health expenditure declined over the years and
flattened out at 29% by 2018. However, this is still relatively high
compared to the OECD average of about 21% in the same year [38].
The composition of health expenditure has shifted dramatically, with
government and social spending on the rise and out‐of‐pocket expense
shrinking accordingly (Fig. A1). This trend is the result of the gradual
expansion of the basic insurance coverage. Although the infant mortal-
ity rate dropped steadily over the same period [37], the challenges of
sustaining the healthcare needs of China's population, and the persis-
tent inequality of access, are yet to be resolved. An ageing society
and rising chronic non‐communicable diseases further hinder these
challenges. The recent COVID‐19 outbreak has placed the design of
the public health system under scrutiny, as the lack of medical sup-
plies, public health specialists and initial information transparency
accentuated the issues of China's fragmented healthcare system.
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